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Abstract 
In many countries, an important driver for concern about public values arises from falling 
trust in public institutions. One widely identified explanation has been the conduct of 
politicians, to which governments around the globe have responded by creating systems of 
ethics regulation and reform. This includes England, where measures instigated by the 2000 
Local Government Act took a particularly centralised approach to improving conduct in local 
government, consisting of a standardised and formalised code of conduct with which 
councillors must comply, and machinery for exercising and adjudicating complaints against 
the code. This paper draws upon research which assesses the impact of this ethical 
regulation on the conduct of councillors, using insights from Foucauldian perspectives on 
government and critiques of government ‘modernisation’. As will be shown, the uneven 
effects of the framework can be interpreted from the extent to which the ‘technologies of 
power’ and ‘technologies of self’ have translated effectively into practices across local 
government. Our research found that resistance to ethics regulation often arose where 
councillors resisted the models of political identity and behaviour it was perceived to 
promote. Particular concentrations of complaints and misconduct were identified where 
councillors believe that recent changes in political management – including moves to 
cabinet executives under the auspices of ‘political modernisation’ – have caused a 
widespread loss of voice among elected representatives. The paper concludes with 
reflections on the near total abolition of the ethical framework in 2011 - itself the 
culmination of mounting resistance - and the extent to which political conduct can be 
managed by such practices of modernisation. 
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Introduction 
 
Across the globe, we have witnessed a growing interest in the promotion of high ethical 
standards in public institutions. This is reflected in the massive arsenal of administrative 
machinery now being deployed in this direction, including codes of conduct, statements of 
values, and various processes for addressing claims of misconduct. In many countries, this is 
driven by the urge to address serious cases of corruption and dishonesty which makes 
effective, legitimate government all but impossible. However, this enterprise often goes 
much wider, to cultivate an array of ethical behaviours among our public servants – officials 
and elected representatives - in their dealings between themselves and the public. Such 
activities are often motivated by the desire to arrest and reverse declining levels of trust in 
public institutions that has been widely identified across democracies. Much of this activity 
has centred on the ethical standards of public officials, but an important strand has 
considered the behaviour of politicians and this is this focus of this paper. 
 
The UK is an interesting context for the analysis of efforts to promote positive public values 
in political conduct. The Labour government of 1997 embarked on a programme of reforms 
for local government in England, which included an intensification and centralisation of 
efforts to regulate the conduct of elected councillors (or ‘elected members’ as they are also 
commonly known). Major components of what has become known as the ‘ethical 
framework’ were the introduction of a code of conduct and processes for assessing, 
investigating and adjudicating on complaints of misconduct. Elements of these 
arrangements can be observed in other countries (see for example Fording et al. 2003) and, 
in England, the ethical framework for local government needs to be seen in the light of 
parallel debates about how the conduct of national politicians might be regulated (Allen and 
Birch, 2011). A core feature of UK practice, and of much current ethics regulation around 
the world, is the assumption that good conduct can be achieved by codifying what is 
regarded as acceptable behaviour, and thereon taking steps to ensure that conduct is 
progressively aligned with these codified standards. In its emphasis on order and control, it 
might thus be said to exemplify key features of ‘modernisation’ in the governmental sphere. 
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For all that ethics regulation has become pervasive, a key question – and one that drives this 
paper – is whether good conduct can actually be promoted by such mechanisms. Whether 
and in what conditions ethics regulation achieves the desired effect is already widely 
debated (see for example Pattison and Pill, 2004). Our particular concern is whether the 
conduct of politicians can be steered effectively by ethics regulation. Can political conduct – 
whether that is treating others with respect, not working for self-interest, or using 
institutional resources appropriately – really be changed by the codification and policing of 
behaviour? Or are there facets of political conduct, as an exercise in the representation of 
interests and mobilisation of power, that make it especially resistant to such regulation, or 
which at least generates ongoing tensions for such endeavours? These are our key 
questions.  
 
The theoretical basis for our analysis draws on the work of Foucault, whose investigations of 
government, power and resistance seem eminently appropriate for an analysis of the 
regulation of conduct. On the one hand, practices for codifying and regulating acceptable 
conduct exemplify the exercise of coercive state power. Yet, the practical reality of ethical 
governance – as many government and academic commentators recognise – is that 
promoting patterns of conduct cannot be realised purely by regulatory compliance. The 
ethical framework might usefully be seen as an ‘advanced liberal’ process (Rose, 1999) 
through which central government is ‘steering and regulating rather than rowing and 
providing’ (Rose, 2000: 324). Moreover, the (supposed) sharing of ethical values, through 
which individuals are meant to be self-regulating – governed through the ‘self-steering 
forces of honour and shame, of propriety, obligation, trust, fidelity, and commitment to 
others’ (ibid.) – is what many would hope to see among councillors in local government. 
However, and this is a further value of Foucauldian insights, it has been clear from English 
local government practice that the ethical framework has been resisted (or even subverted); 
indeed, this resistance culminated in the virtual abolition of the ethical framework by the 
coalition government, as one of its first acts on entering office. By looking at this resistance, 
and what it says about political conduct, we can thereby identify not just the immediate, 
managerial problems of ethical governance, but also reveal more fundamental difficulties in 
modernising politics by such means.   
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The evidence for our analysis is drawn from in-depth qualitative research conducted into 
the ethical framework in English local government in 2008, in which we examined the 
effects of the ethical framework on the cultures and processes of local councils, the conduct 
of councillors and the implications for public trust (Cowell et al. 2011). In this paper, we 
focus on the relationship between the ethical framework and councillor conduct and the 
patterns that emerged from the data. While in some councils, we found that the 
assumptions embedded in the ethical framework chimed with existing norms of political 
conduct; for others it did not. As some analysts might have expected, we saw allegations of 
misconduct being made for political purposes; some councillors perceived the ethical 
framework to be a way of suppressing voices, while others saw it as a tool to get their voices 
heard. Ironically, this type of (mis)use of ethical framework might be regarded as a by-
product of the programme of political modernisation that has unfolded across English local 
government, and the perception that it has caused a loss of ‘voice’ for certain ‘backbench’ 
politicians.  
 
The next section of the paper outlines the evolution of the ethical framework in English local 
government in more detail, before locating it in wider accounts of local government 
‘modernisation’. Following this, we explain how Foucauldian ideas are used to interpret its 
operation. Turning to the empirical material, first we expand on the methodology used in 
our research, then set out our findings. Here we sketch very briefly the generality of 
perceived impacts of the ethical framework before tracing in more depth the forms and 
consequences of some of the resistance that we observed. In our concluding section, we 
reflect on the implications of our findings, both for the practice of ethics regulation and the 
entire enterprise of trying to promote good conduct among politicians through such 
practices. 
 
Ethics regulation and local government modernisation 
 
The ethical framework for local government in England has been the product of 
considerable contestation, as what hitherto had been a comparatively informal approach to 
local government ethics (Doig and Skelcher, 2001) became supplemented and directed by a 
more centralised set of arrangements. The framework which was set out under the Local 
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Government Act 2000 (Pt III) as part of Labour’s modernisation agenda for local government 
and has been described by the Committee for Standards on Public Life (CSPL) as ‘arguably 
the most extensive and comprehensive statutory framework for standards of conduct of any 
group of public office-holders in the UK’ (2005: 51). The Act required all local authorities to 
introduce a model code of conduct for councillors, establish a register of members’ 
interests, and set up local standards committees. It also resulted in the establishment of the 
regulatory bodies - the Standards Board for England (in 2009 renamed Standards for 
England1) and the Adjudication Panel for England (the functions of which, since 2010, have 
been taken over by First Tier Tribunal) – with, initially, the Standards Board taking on the 
prime role in assessing and investigating complaints. 
 
In setting up such a structured, centralised system, with strong investigatory and disciplinary 
powers, the Government faced down the considerable support for a more self-regulatory 
system to continue (CSPL 1997), in which local government took prime responsibility for 
regulating conduct. It also set aside arguments that the proposed arrangements were 
excessive, given that local government in the UK has generally displayed relatively good 
conduct (CSPL, 2005; EU, 2007). Rather, the system that emerged in 2000 reflected the 
government’s calculation that it needed to respond to high profile examples of misconduct 
in councils such as Labour-run Doncaster, and the belief that only such an arms-length 
system could promote public confidence in local government (Macaulay and Lawton, 2006). 
Nevertheless, criticism of inter alia, the backlog of complaints being dealt with by the 
Standards Board prompted some decentralisation of these arrangements. With the 2008 
Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act, the role of assessing, investigating 
and taking appropriate action on most complaints was passed from the Standards Board to 
local standards committees. Meanwhile, the Standards Board switched to becoming a 
‘strategic regulator’, monitoring and advising on the overall implementation of the 
framework, and only investigating the most serious cases. 
 
In various ways, the ethical framework can be seen as consistent with the post-1997 Labour 
government’s wider ‘local government modernisation agenda’ – a set of policies designed to 
                                                 
1
 In this paper, for convenience, we refer to it as the Standards Board. 
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achieve transformational change in local government (Downe and Martin, 2006). Such 
programmes of modernisation tend to be ambitious in their depth and scope, placing 
considerable faith in universal ethics and progress, in the belief that ‘transformational 
change is … not only self-evidently necessary but also achievable’ (Geddes and Martin, 2000, 
392).  
 
What seems especially problematic is this extension of modernisation into the realm of the 
political, and the application of universalising ethical norms to political conduct. For all that 
recent changes to local government may serve to produce a ‘managerialised state’ where 
‘well-managed organisations provide the framework within which political manoeuvring 
over the mixed economy of welfare can occur’ (Clarke, 1998: 178-179), those very practices 
of political manoeuvring can prove more difficult to contain.  Such containment is arguably 
made more difficult by the breadth of principles that fall within the ambit of the ethical 
framework. The code embraces practices that might be perceived as corrupt (on 
Selflessness and Openness, for example). Although there is significant social consensus in 
the UK that councillors should not be corrupt, and instances of genuine corruption are rare, 
it has been less easy to specify the practices required to avoid a suspicion of corruption. 
Moreover, the code also seeks to regulate the more open-ended categories of behaviour of 
treating others with respect and not bringing the local authority into disrepute, which 
unavoidably permeate debates about legitimate political argument.   
 
This clash may well be exacerbated in the UK when one considers another dimension of the 
local government modernisation agenda which, like the ethical framework, is trained on 
elected representatives. The introduction of cabinet executives aimed to deliver more 
accountable and streamlined forms of decision-making whereby there is an 
executive/backbencher split amongst politicians and a clearer concentration on powers 
being invested in either cabinets or elected mayors. Whatever the intention, this led to a 
series of conflicts about the exercise of power. In some councils, there have been divisions 
between those in the cabinet and others: backbenchers felt that these changes reduced the 
opportunity for political debate and their chance to influence decision-making (Davis and 
Geddes, 2000), which has led to frustration and complaints of voicelessness. The 
modernisation process has also tended to promote councillors as detached, professional, 
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almost managerial figures, working collaboratively with others to steer positive change for 
their area as a whole (Entwistle et al. 2005). This sits uneasily with the identity of councillors 
that may see themselves as activists or community advocates. As we shall explain below, 
part of the problems in promulgating specific notions of good conduct arise out of the 
effects on the identities of councillors. 
  
Interpreting the regulation of conduct 
 
This likelihood of encountering struggle in the regulation of ethics in (local) government can 
fruitfully be explored through Foucault’s discussions on ‘government’ which relate to the 
practices by which behaviour is shaped according to certain norms (Murdoch, 2000). 
Government in a Foucauldian sense can be seen as the ‘conduct of conduct: a form of 
activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons’ (Gordon, 
1991: 2). Although conventionally used to examine the constitution of society as a 
governable realm, the methodological emphasis on the practices of government seem 
equally relevant in understanding relations between different components of the state. 
 
Importantly, the shaping of conduct is not merely a matter of domination (McNay, 1994). In 
the context of our research, it is not as simple as telling councillors how they should behave; 
government is performed more through the ‘manipulation of conscience’ (McNay, 1994: 
122). Furthermore, the complaints system could be said to entail a ‘relationship of power’ 
i.e. a ‘mode of action that does not act directly and immediately upon others [but] [i]nstead 
acts upon their actions…on possible or actual future or present actions’ (Foucault, 1982: 
342). Altogether then, the ethical framework can be seen as a mechanism by which the 
process of government has established a common goal of ethical behaviour (see for 
example Rose and Miller, 1992) which is tied in with other legislative, regulatory and 
discursive practices to work upon individual councillors’ way of behaving. 
 
The pertinence of this perspective is that it can be used to interpret the various ways by 
which ethics regulation is deemed to ‘work’. Indeed, there is an echo here between the 
dominant explanatory themes of the analysis of ethics regulation and Foucauldian 
perspectives. Many analysts have complained that the 2000 Act instituted a move from an 
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integrity model in which councillors and local authorities are trusted to oversee their own 
behaviour to a compliance model of regulation (see Lawton, 2005), in which central 
government exercises greater surveillance and control. Such moves have been criticised as 
unlikely to be effective, because formal, regulatory mechanisms - in which misconduct is 
corrected ex post through the disciplining of transgressors – require a wider basis of 
support, in which a shared conception of what constitutes good conduct is actively 
embraced, routinised and pervasively reinforced through more informal, day-to-day 
interactions within a given organisational setting (Doig and Skelcher, 2001; Greasley, 2006). 
In line with this, organisational measures should foster active responsibility for ethical 
conduct rather than just passive compliance with rules (Bovens, 1998; Greasley et al. 2006). 
This entails, in effect, that councillors identify with and embrace responsibility for upholding 
the code of conduct. Concomitantly, achieving compliance requires that rules are not 
merely imposed upon councillors but that ethical behaviour becomes the norm – something 
that ‘appears – or claims – to emerge out of the very nature of that which is governed’ (Rose 
and Valverde, 1998: 544). As Foucault suggests, whereas ethics is a practice; ethos is a 
manner of being’ (1991: 377).  
 
However, a Foucauldian perspective would take us beyond this counter position of integrity 
models and compliance models. After all, a core assumption of both models, is that through 
the careful combination of practices – be they more obviously coercive or more tacit – the 
alignment of conduct with a set of agreed principles can be achieved. An emphasis on the 
actual practices of government can highlight rather more fundamental problems with this 
aspiration. To create, reinforce and support norms of behaviour, ‘tends to be accompanied 
by an astonishing proliferation of legislation’ (Ewald, 1990, quoted in Rose and Valverde, 
1998: 542). This can be observed in the almost inexorable tendency of the ethical 
framework to expand in complexity (CSPL, 1997), as seemingly straightforward principles 
like selflessness or respect for others are decomposed, hierarchically into operational 
requirements which then in turn become the subject of an ever-evolving and expanding 
suite of interpretive guidance to help local governments pursue ‘good conduct’. This 
growing complexity is driven by the almost inexhaustible difficulty of interpreting abstract 
principles in specific contexts, against which the state struggles to ‘catch up’. Despite 
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seeking to guide councillors in how they might balance potentially completing ethical 
principles (such as the widely examined tension between integrity and efficiency (De Vries, 
2002)), this potential for tensions and inconsistencies does not disappear. 
 
What most analysts of ethics regulation tend to miss is the ever-present risk of resistance. 
Such behaviour tends to be collapsed into ‘non-compliance’ with a set of values presumed 
to be agreed, but which demands the more careful analysis that Foucault’s ideas can offer. 
Foucault suggests that in any power relation ‘there is necessarily the possibility of 
resistance’ (1996: 441). Certainly, if we see the implementation of the ethical framework as 
a power relation, the possibility of resistance clearly exists.  Whereas a relationship of pure 
domination would ensure no alternative but to comply, in acting on norms and culture, the 
ethical framework offers opportunities for active or passive compliance or resistance. 
 
One can posit a number of reasons why elected representatives may be particularly likely to 
resist certain facets of ethics regulation, and to do so effectively. On an immediate level, 
there is the competitive nature of politics, and the incentives this creates for securing short-
term advantage rather than upholding principles of good governance (Mulgan, 2006). The 
unavoidable interpretive flexibility of ethics regulation is problematic where social contexts 
are competitive rather than collaborative. More fundamentally, even with the domain of 
state practices, ethics regulation is not the only basis of moral authority, legitimacy or the 
exercising of discipline for misconduct. The status of the ethical framework – and the 
agencies charged with promoting it - may be challenged where councillors draw moral 
authority from their personal judgement, their constituency, or the need to deliver on party 
policy. The electoral process may well be seem as the pre-eminent disciplinary process 
acting upon councillors, deference to which explains why although the ethical framework 
makes provision for a range of sanctions for misconduct, there is limited scope directly to 
demand that a councillor be expelled. 
 
Through elections, political parties and constituency networks, councillors also have strong 
connections to the ‘external environment’ of local government, from which norms and 
legitimation might be derived, that weigh against measures introduced within the council as 
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an organisation (Maesschalck, 2004). As Flyvbjerg (1998) notes, the techniques of 
modernisation and rationality – including devices like a code of conduct – tend to be 
relatively new, and unlikely swiftly therefore to displace relationships of loyalty, affiliation 
and identity which have bound certain actors together for long periods of time, and which 
are deeply implicated in the political culture of places. Indeed, this is often promoted as a 
positive feature of local councillors: the fact that they come from a variety of backgrounds 
means that therefore they ‘not only bring a range of voices directly into the council chamber 
but also enable a myriad of networks to be connected with council members’ (Councillors 
Commission, 2007: 15). 
 
The problem, then, is not simply that the complexities of governing conduct in a myriad 
variety of social settings, with potentially conflicting values, means that codified norms are 
never sufficient. One can also begin to see how politicians may construct reasons for 
transgressing the norms set out in codes of conduct. More fundamentally, one might doubt 
whether politics could be subject to (and thereby ‘outside’) the striving for ethical universals 
to which ethics regulation aspires. As a result, one may expect resistance to the 
technologies of power and self through which it is enacted. Such resistance may be overt, 
and directed at the code, to specific misconduct allegations, to the sanctions imposed or to 
the entire authority of the ethical framework. As Scott (1985) and others have noted, 
sometimes resistance can be more hidden. For those that might feel themselves otherwise 
powerless, Scott ‘describes a repertoire of choices that highlight noncompliance as a form of 
dissent with the new status quo’ (Levi, 1997: 17, referring to Scott 1985). Bound up with 
resistance is also the possibility of unintended consequences, as the ethical framework is 
used to exercise power in ways and directions beyond the straightforward promulgation of 
good conduct, as actors use the moral charge and high profile of misconduct allegations to 
act on those that they oppose. 
 
The task, then, is to see whether we can identify a normalisation or shaping of conduct 
through the ethical framework, or a resistance to the rules, and what we can learn from the 
contexts in which resistance has emerged. 
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Methodology 
 
The research project on which this paper is based was a longitudinal evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the ethical framework. It is structured around nine case studies of local 
authorities from across England. The prime data for this paper is drawn from interviews we 
conducted with 119 individuals between June and October 2008. The interviews were semi-
structured and designed to elicit views on the practices of ethics regulation in each council, 
and the participants’ own views of the ethical framework and the effectiveness of the 
standards system. We conducted interviews with local authority chief executives; with 
monitoring officers (responsible for overseeing the operation of the ethical framework), and 
other senior officers; with council and party group leaders; chairs, elected and independent 
members of standards committees; other elected councillors; parish councils, 
representatives from partner bodies such as Local Strategic Partnerships, and journalists 
with experience of covering local government.  
 
We were careful to ensure that our case studies met a range of criteria (see Table 1). In 
particular, we specifically selected councils experiencing many and few complaints under 
the code of conduct. Political context was also a consideration (see, for example, Fording et 
al., 2003), and we selected councils controlled by different parties, those which have been 
relatively political stable over a period of time as well as those which had seen changes in 
control. In order to examine whether implementation of the ethical framework may be 
affected by the quality of the management more widely, we included authorities which had 
scored ‘excellent’ or ‘good’ in the Audit Commission’s assessment of performance (CPA), as 
well as those which fared less well. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
A key facet of our research is that we took a dual approach to the interviewing. Some of the 
questions sought to test the impact of a whole suite of variables identified by the literature 
on ethics regulation as likely to be important in promoting change (such as the actions of 
leaders, the skills of the monitoring officer, and the interventions of local standards 
committees) – this element of the research is written up more comprehensively elsewhere 
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(Cowell et al. 2011). However, we took great care at the start of our interviews to get people 
talking about the nature of politics in their local authority as they saw it, and whether and 
why they felt there were issues with conduct, without imposing the prior assumption that 
formal ethics regulation could be a significant factor. The analysis presented below draws 
very heavily on the narratives that emerged from these accounts. 
 
Turning to the analysis, we first outline ways in which the ethical framework shapes the 
conduct of councillors in the direction intended by its proponents, in broad terms, before 
focusing more closely on ways in which the framework has been resisted or subverted. 
Throughout we draw on Foucault’s work on ‘government’ and on power/resistance.  
 
The shaping of conduct 
 
Our research provided much to support the findings of extant research that, since the 
introduction of the ethical framework, councillor conduct has improved to some extent. 
Cross-national surveys have suggested that there has been a reduction in serious forms of 
misconduct (BMG, 2007; 2008), with some respondents feeling that there had been a 
dramatic improvement overall. Our qualitative research identified similar perceptions. What 
it also identified were indications of the causal mechanisms at work, which echo Foucault’s 
work on government in terms of the ways in which individuals’ conduct is ‘shaped’ 
according to certain norms. We were able to examine the ways in which, through the 
inculcation of a particular perspective, councillors learn to see one way of behaving as ‘right’ 
and another as ‘wrong’. For example, the leader of one of our case study councils (Case 
Study A), actually suggested that any effect of the ethical framework on the conduct of 
councillors was ‘unconscious’. The framework was not something which members actually 
considered on a day to day basis but as the Monitoring Officer from the same council said, 
although ‘they keep forgetting the rules. But that’s not to say they don’t apply them okay … 
and they’re aware of it [the ethical framework]’. 
 
In other respects, the effects of the ethical framework have been markedly uneven. While 
evidence suggests that Monitoring Officers, for example, see it as exerting a positive effect 
on conduct others, notably ‘backbench’ councillors (i.e. those outside cabinet structures), 
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felt that levels of conduct had remained the same or even become worse (BMG, 2008). It 
appears that people ‘inside’ the ethical framework, with some capacity to influence its 
implementation, appreciate it more than those subject to it; and it is appreciated least, in 
relative terms, by those who may already perceive themselves to have been marginalised by 
local government modernisation. Impacts also differed markedly between local authorities.2 
In some councils, good conduct is normalised, being very much part of the local ethos. This 
was exemplified in Case Study A, where the leader of the council described local councillors 
as follows:   
 
‘I would say that the large majority of the members… are retired.  They’ve come into 
it in my view for the right reasons.  They’re not on the make any more. […] I know it 
sounds a bit smug and I don’t mean it that way, but [they] are actually here to serve 
a purpose…As far as I’m aware they’re coming to make a difference, but not to make 
a difference to themselves’ (Leader of the Council, Case Study A). 
 
Selflessness and impartiality is thus represented as intrinsic to councillors’ identity in this 
authority and complaints under the code have been very few in number. The ethical 
framework also seemed to be operationalised most effectively where the identities it 
fostered were already strongly reflected in political practices. Thus, in Case Study G, the 
council was a product of a relatively recent reorganisation (in 1996) which had replaced the 
former, smaller district councils, with their strong attachment to place-based communities 
and a reputation of bullying, with a larger council, in which politics was said to be more 
detached and professionalized but also more friendly. Key officers and councillors thus felt 
themselves to be operating within a modernising local authority. The Leader of the Labour 
Group explained that: 
 
‘I made it very clear to the Conservative group leader at the time that our position 
would be not opposition for the sake of opposition, it would be a case of where we 
agree we would support, and where we disagree we would firmly oppose’.  
 
                                                 
2
 Of course, our case studies were selected precisely to capture these differences, rather than represent a 
singular ‘typical’ local authority experience. 
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In Case Study B, not only did we find most key figures, officers and councillors, supporting 
the council’s reputation of ‘doing good by doing right’. Individual councillors also saw their 
role as essentially achieving the best outcome for the council as a whole, even to the extent 
of explaining tough, distributive decisions that could not benefit everybody: ‘my job as 
councillor essentially is to bring bad news’ (Councillor, Case Study B). This council had 
participated actively in many of Labour’s local government modernisation agenda reforms. 
Here too, cases of misconduct had been very few in number. 
 
Our findings suggest a culture of ethical behaviour in line with the code has already, or is in 
the process of being developed within some local authorities, and that the various 
‘technologies’ of the code – such as training – act to reinforce a prevailing ethos rather than 
via coercive regulatory practices. However, this has not been the experience of ethics 
regulation everywhere. In some councils, changing the prevailing norms of conduct proved 
difficult because of the institutionalisation of certain types of behaviour (Doig and Skelcher, 
2001). We found councillors resisting the ethical framework in a variety of ways, but also 
evidence of deliberate subversion of the framework.  
 
Resistance to identities 
 
As we have discussed, modern forms of discipline (in a Foucauldian sense) are not simply 
about domination but, in terms of governmentality, about subjectification, yet it is this very 
‘process *…+ through which individuals are regulated [which] also provide[s] the basis from 
which resistance to such government can be articulated’ (McNay, 1994: 123). Our research 
supports this suggestion, in that we found a resistance to the identities being placed upon 
councillors, as detached from their communities, and primarily loyal to the council as a 
collective entity of value in its own right. Moreover, some individuals sought not only to 
resist what they saw as over-bearing examples of imposed norms but also, in some 
instances, to capitalise on this politically by asserting their own independence and 
individuality and, in some cases, to make statements about what they saw as their roles as 
elected representatives of their local communities. Several councillors pointed out that they 
had been elected by their local communities and thus should act with this conception of the 
public interest in mind – even if this meant behaving in ways seen by other councillors as 
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unethical or not in keeping with the concerns of their own party groups (see Copus, 1999: 
312).  
 
These identities and affiliations shaped the extent to which the ethical framework – as a 
series of normalising and disciplinary practices – actually exerted any influence. One 
councillor in case study C explained that there are some councillors in their authority who 
have been reported to Standards for England on a number of occasions but 
 
‘Their attitude to life, which is negative and aggressive, will be not be changed by the 
Code of Conduct. They don’t respect it. The ethical framework has made no difference 
to them’.  
 
One of the ‘accused’ claimed that he was told that he was being suspended because he was 
damaging the public perception of the council, but he argued that the public were totally 
behind him. He used people coming up to him in the pub as the evidence for this position 
and the fact that he continues to be re-elected: ‘I’m a man of honour. My standards are far 
higher than those in the council’. Similarly, in case study D, a district council in an affluent 
part of rural southern England, the council lacks a significant urban focus or spatial identity. 
In this context, representing village parish interests takes pre-eminence, and again 
councillors may pay more attention to whether they keep getting elected than the practices 
of ethics regulation. 
 
This resistance can be observed in the face of disciplinary sanctions, including suspensions 
for misconduct, as well as the more routine application of information and training on the 
code of conduct and its meaning: 
 
‘You’ve got people that are quite willing to take on advice and listen and take on the 
training.  People that naturally just respond to it.  And I suppose we’ve got other 
councillors who were more antagonistic towards it.  So I think initially probably they 
didn’t take on board the training.  It’s almost like they weren’t interested in listening’ 
(Deputy Monitoring Officer: Case Study C). 
 
16 
 
Many previous commentaries on the implementation of the ethical framework have 
identified declarations of interest as the element which has proved particularly difficult to 
translate into practices, especially at the parish level (Macaulay and Lawton, 2006). Viewed 
through the managerial lens of the ethical framework, and of political modernisation more 
widely, this might be seen essentially an issue of learning the new demarcations of 
acceptable conduct – of councillors registering their personal interests correctly, then 
recognising when they may have a personal and/or prejudicial interest which would prevent 
them from taking part in a particular council decision. This is a sphere in which the 
Standards Board issued additional guidance. But the problems arising from this part of the 
code are not simply attributable to councillors deliberately using their position to promote a 
personal interest (though we would not deny that this happens). Rather, councillors have 
difficulty confirming to the idea that being a councillor means ‘abstracting’ oneself from 
interests that tie them to particular places, issues and social groups, when they see 
representing those interests as intrinsic to their identity as a councillor. In some instances, 
the resistance is to the idea that what are regarded as ‘private’ interests should be re-
categorised as legitimate public knowledge.3  As one Monitoring Officer reflected:  
 
‘We’ve had difficulties with a particular parish, a particular councillor of [name of 
parish] who doesn’t seem to understand what declarations of interest mean.  [It’s] like 
an ingrained sort of refusal to accept the code…they say “well you know we can’t 
possibly operate like that because everybody in this … it’s such a small place everybody 
knows everybody else.  It doesn’t work like that, you know”….They think that it’s 
almost optional for them’ (Monitoring Officer: Case Study E). 
 
This problematising of the ability of councillors to act on behalf of their interests is one way 
in which resistance to the ethical framework is entangled with the exercise of power. We 
now turn to ways in which resistance to the ethical framework was connected to the way in 
which politics was being (re)organised. In line with Philp’s observations (2001, 365), this can 
                                                 
3
 Throughout its period of operation there was a struggle to define how far the ethical framework should apply 
to politicians for conduct on their ‘private life’ rather than their ‘public life’. The case surrounding Ken 
Livingstone (the former Mayor of London) hit the national newspaper headlines, though such issues were less 
prominent in our case studies. 
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entail not just explicit rejection of the rules, as observed above, but the tactical deployment 
of those rules. 
 
Resistance, subversion and the exercise of power 
 
The potential for the code of conduct to be used as a tool for individual councillors’ own 
ends rather than simply as a means of ensuring compliance with a set of imposed standards, 
materialised in some of our case studies. Councillors made misconduct allegations about 
opponents but, in many instances, this was portrayed as little more than a tit-for-tat playing 
out of personal animosities. Thus, for example, a local councillor told us that ‘the code of 
conduct offers people the ideal way of levelling scores’ (Case Study D). In another council, 
we were told that the ethical framework has ‘given weapons to people to cause mischief 
where mischief shouldn’t really be made’ (Case Study F). Other researchers too have noted 
that the machinery had become ‘a focus for vexatious complaints and personal vendettas’ 
(Macaulay and Lawton, 2006: 487). Although the 2008 Act introduced filtering processes 
within local authority standards committees to weed out such vexatious complaints (see 
Doig and Skelcher, 2001), some still got through the process. 
 
Rather than dismissing such behaviour as simply aberrant, if we view the complaints system 
from a Foucauldian perspective as a ‘relationship of power’ (Foucault, 1982) – as a mode of 
action that acts upon the present or possible future actions of others – we can begin to see 
how some complainants have been attempting to have a bearing upon the potential future 
actions of those they have complained about. In certain instances, people perceived that 
ethics regulation was used by those in power to curtail the political activities of others. 
According to some interviewees, such attempts at dominating the actions of others were 
not just confined to local councillors. In some cases, a similar relationship of power was 
wielded by senior officers – as illustrated by this councillor: 
 
‘The monitoring officer is not averse to threatening…people that they could be in 
breach of the code of conduct if they aren’t very careful.  And you think … well I 
refuse to be cowed by all this, but it’s very bad.  And again of course it does nothing 
whatever to enhance the reputation of the code of conduct … cos you think it’s just 
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there as a big stick to be used against anyone who dares ask tough questions’ 
(Councillor, Case Study D).  
 
What might be presented by one person as a helpful reminder of the rules is interpreted by 
another as a ‘threat’. Councillors from other case studies, too, expressed concern at the 
ethical framework being used to provide a system of control, curtailing their freedom to 
question or challenge officers by categorising such conduct as ‘bullying’, or ‘bringing the 
council into disrepute’. 
 
If this much might be expected, what was surprising was that so many interviewees would 
relate the incidence of problems or complaints under the code to wider changes to the 
political management arrangements, and to the resulting reallocation of power. Thus case 
study D has experienced a long tradition of independents (i.e. of councillors that were not 
members of political parties), but this had shifted through the 1980s and 1990s to a 
situation where independents were just one part of a multi-party government. What 
brought issues of conduct to a head was the ending of the long tradition of political parties 
and independents being represented proportionately on committees to a ‘modernised’ 
system of executive powers centred on a cabinet constituted solely by members of the 
dominant party. It is in this context that complaints proliferated, and it was suggested that 
the ethical framework provided a further means of curtailing the influence of minority 
groups and individuals:  
 
‘What we have seen is one group just get a majority and then actually behave as if 
the whole council is its own property, and it’s been disastrous … and that group is 
now starting to use the code of conduct…to keep people in line if they displease it, 
which is even worse’ (Councillor, Case Study D). 
 
This was not the only power dynamic we observed. Perhaps the most interesting 
unanticipated pattern of responses that we encountered in some of our cases was the 
suggestion that using the code to make complaints provided a way of ensuring that the 
voices of those members who believed themselves to be disempowered were heard by the 
ruling group (see also Smulian, 2009) or by the public more widely. In Scott’s terms, it might 
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be seen as a ‘weapon of the weak’ (Scott, 1985). Sometimes this was characterised in 
dismissive terms, viz:  
 
‘I think they use the code of conduct occasionally as an opportunity to flex their 
muscles and to cause some disruption’ (Chair of Standards Committee, Case Study 
H). 
 
‘I think my initial reaction [to the ethical framework] was that it was a charter for the 
politically weak to make difficulties for the ruling party.  If you do an analysis of the 
number of complaints made and who by and against whom and do an analysis of the 
political parties involved, you will find that not only were many of them spurious, but 
they were in my view politically motivated’ (Councillor, Case Study H).  
 
But others, and not just the perpetrators, recognise the rationale: 
 
 ‘…They [independent members] have realised that the way to shall we say force co-
operation from people who don’t have any other control is to challenge them 
through the standards. And they’re using standards as a weapon … Nobody likes 
having to explain themselves in great detail and depth, which is what the standards 
committee is looking at; ‘why did you do that?’, ‘what’s happened here?’ So they use 
it as an alternative means of debate, if you want to put it that way. And good luck to 
them. It’s very clever’ (Councillor, Standards Committee Member: Case Study C). 
 
As Levi suggests, it is entirely possible for individual acts of noncompliance or subversion of 
the rules to result in changes in both policy and institutional arrangements (1997: 33). Not 
only are the powerful forced to account for themselves, as in the quote above, but the 
‘misuse’ of the ethical framework complained about in case study C, above, resulted in the 
constitution being changed to allow more debate in council. There is a wider context to 
some concentrations of complaints in that, in various parts of the UK, councils have seen the 
emergence of ‘independent’ parties, specifically in response to the belief that the 
mainstream parties do not represent a particular social or spatial constituency, often 
sparked by oppositional views on a particular topic. In this context, challenging ‘the council’ 
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- the civic entity perceived to be the source of the problem - is a common strategy. Clearly, 
such actions are unlikely to enhance the reputation of local government, as architects of the 
ethical framework might have wished. 
 
Such acts of ‘non-compliance’ did not always target just other councillors and officers 
directly. In some instances, this subversion of the intended use of ethics regulation also 
appears designed to attract and channel public attention. For those without conventional 
means of exercising influence, some form of denunciation of those in power offers a simple 
device for attracting attention and undermining authority (Scott 1985). Thus the existence 
of the ethical framework, in some instances, has allowed its deployment as a ‘scandal 
weapon’ (Belzak, 2008) – a means of discrediting opponents through recourse to the moral 
authority of a national code of conduct, and triggering what may then be a high profile 
assessment and investigation process. For example, in case study H we were told that the 
leader of one of the opposition parties carefully examined the register of members’ 
interests in council meetings, to identify scope to making complaints – a pointed illustration 
of how the technologies of the ethical framework, in problematising certain categories of 
behaviour and making them actionable, can then be used for purposes other than those 
intended. 
 
Another dimension of this pattern of behaviour links back to our earlier discussion of 
political identities, and concerns the wider importance of being a public figure. There is very 
little public knowledge or understanding of the role of councillors, of how they get selected 
and what they do (Councillors Commission, 2007). This might explain why some councillors 
are prone to making more of a noise, in order to raise their own profiles and make their 
work more obvious to the public. For example: 
 
‘there was a time when I felt that unless you’d had three or four complaints made 
against you, you could hardly call yourself a local politician of any standing’ (Case 
Study H, councillor). 
 
In one council (Case Study C) we found comparatively little media coverage of standards 
issues, yet there was a history of contentious behaviour that violated the rules of the ethical 
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framework. Respondents suggested there was almost an escalation of poor behaviour in a 
bid to be complained about. The first referral to the Standards Board was a councillor using 
inappropriate language - ‘you’re a load of crap’. This was regarded as being ‘political banter’ 
and there was no sanction, so the councillor concerned ‘ratcheted’ up the bad language, 
which provoked further complaints but there was still no sanction. According to one 
councillor, 
 
‘The judgments of the Standards Board have encouraged the attitude - they didn’t 
find me guilty, so I’ll carry on. There is no shame in being taken to the Standards 
Board anymore – it is like a badge of honour’ (Councillor, Case Study C). 
 
This situation hasn’t been helped by the accusation from a councillor of the Monitoring 
Officer promoting the ethical framework as a way to try and resolve problems within the 
council (‘it’s there, so use it’). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our findings provide a vivid illustration of the diversity of effects that the ethical framework 
has exerted across English local government, and of the merits of using ideas from Foucault 
to interpret the changes. The ethical framework brings together an array of ‘technologies of 
power’ and ‘technologies of self’ to encourage behaviour that is aligned with the code of the 
conduct. While there is evidence that the machinery of the ethical framework has served to 
promote certain norms and practices, our analysis also shows the tendency for resistance, 
notably to the political identity of a councillor embodied in the code, and to the deployment 
of the code in ways which seek to influence the actions of others. Three sets of findings 
follow from these patterns of resistance. 
 
Firstly, the experience of ethics regulation in England provides us with another example of 
how centralised policies predicated on key facets of modernisation like clear, rational 
codified norms and  practices run into ‘contrasting sets of political values and priorities’ at 
the local level, and ‘very different approaches to dealing with the tensions’ (Geddes and 
Martin, 2000: 386). Importantly, our research encountered very little overt resistance to the 
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basic ethical principles of public life (honestly, accountability, selflessness, etc); indeed, 
survey research conducted by government bodies has generally reaffirmed widespread 
support for these values. Even those who subverted the ethical framework for political ends 
tacitly draw on the social power of its misconduct categories in their denunciation of others. 
However, what survey research does not reveal, but which we are alerted to by a 
Foucauldian perspective, is the ways in which the governmental practices designed to align 
behaviour with these values can still be subject to intense dispute. The ten years of the 
ethical framework for local government witnessed something of a struggle to specify, 
through guidance and decisions, the operational meaning of these values, but which could 
never reduce the scope for interpretive flexibility at local level, as these values were applied 
to practical situations. 
 
Our second set of findings is that the appropriation of the ethical framework to influence 
the actions of others was not, as might have been hoped, confined to those seeking to 
maintain good conduct. We also found concerns that dominant individuals or groups were 
using the ethical framework to preserve their positions and damage challengers. We also 
found that in some of our case study areas, councillors who were (or who considered 
themselves to be) more marginalised were also making deliberate use of the system try and 
ensure that their concerns and issues were heard. Perhaps this is unsurprising: after all the 
use of complaints systems as a means of exercising voice, is a particularly powerful tool for 
those who may have no other means of empowerment (Dibben and Bartlett, 2001). What is 
a particular irony is that in a number of our case studies, such a use of the ethical 
framework can be linked to programmes of political modernisation, designed to achieve 
clear lines of accountability and executive power, but which – by concentrating executive 
power - had the side effect of marginalising others. To the extent that ethics regulation, like 
wider programmes of political change, are caught on enduring dilemmas of political 
authority and openness, we should not expect codes of conduct straightforwardly to resolve 
such issues. 
 
These patterns inform our third finding, which is that the practical challenges (and political 
repercussions) of seeking to regulate councillor conduct from the centre have rendered the 
ethical framework rather unstable. As noted in the introduction, the 2008 Act reforms were 
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designed to roll back central control in favour of greater local management of the ethical 
framework. This new regime barely had time to bed in before the May 2010 general 
election, which brought into power a coalition government committed to abolishing 
significant components of the ethical framework. This move was driven by a number of 
factors, not least the need to slash public spending, but can be seen as the culmination of 
resistance by a section of local government over the previous decade, echoed by decidedly 
ambivalent press coverage of ethics cases. The ethical framework was seen, variously, as 
unnecessary, complex, ineffective (in sanctioning and changing patterns of conduct), and 
heavy-handed (in pursuing what were seen as minor failings of conduct) (Macaulay and 
Lawton, 2006).  Opponents of abolition ensured that councils must still have a code of 
conduct, but there is as yet no national prescription as to content. Ethics regulation in 
English local government is now a radically more localised affair. 
 
We suggest that these findings about the recent English experience have wider implications 
for the project of ethics regulation, especially in the political sphere, but there are some 
caveats. Although in this paper we have focused on patterns of resistance and subversion of 
ethics regulation, it is not our suggestion that ethics regulation is inevitably subverted or 
resisted, or that this is the dominant response of most councillors. As others have noted 
(CSPL 1997), the large majority of councillors confirm to widely accepted norms of good 
conduct most of the time. Also, in drawing attention to acts that might be seen analytically 
as ‘resistance’, we do not wish to imply that all misconduct and misuse of the ethical 
framework represents some kind of ‘heroic’ resistance, based on positive, public-spirited 
intentions. Even allowing for subjective interpretation, many cases hinge simply on 
mistakes, errors of judgement, instances of bullying and the promotion of personal 
interests. The language is not entirely neutral here, insofar as we have may associate 
‘resistance’ with entirely positive responses to monolithic, myopic modes of government 
(Scott, 1985) – Foucault himself was, of course, more ethically neutral about his analytical 
approach (Gordon, 1991). By their very nature, however, post-structuralist perspectives 
problematise our capacity for forming ethical judgements about what might, in the case of 
ethics regulation, be interpreted as a positive struggle for ethical universals.  
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One implication that arises from our research is the need to question the scope for 
regulating the conduct of politics – or at least, frame carefully our aspirations for what it can 
achieve. As we have seen, politicians themselves legitimise their actions through an array of 
relationships – with the goals of their party, with their constituency, as well as to the council 
as an organisation - in which effective compliance with a code of conduct is not necessarily 
the most important. Moreover, the construction of a particular kind of councillor identity – 
predicated on a particular understanding of selflessness and objectivity, detached from local 
interests – risks cutting through the various ties between councillors, constituency and 
place: ties which many politicians believe to be the basis of their support. Insofar as the 
ethical framework is a component of constituting particular councillor identities, resistance 
to it can usefully be read as part of the struggle to define the ethical principles on which this 
should be based, and the extent to which these can or should be universalised. Further 
research could usefully examine what local authorities have learned from their experiences 
with the ethical framework, even as mandatory requirements are rolled back.  
 
More broadly, there is merit in seeing ethics regulation as constitutive of struggles to 
promote ethical universals and civilise political conduct, which is bound up with the exercise 
of power, rather than a rational, external managerial process that flows logically from 
agreed principles. The problem lies not with the concept of ethics – or the use of values in 
justifying action – but the aspiration that all of the relevant ethical principles can be 
contained in a specific set of governmental technologies and practices. In our own research, 
while we were made aware of numerous misconduct cases, these very rarely stemmed from 
reasons of corruption or apparent self-gain, but rather because of an appeal to other 
principles over the ‘imposed’ norms of ethical behaviour. Indeed, while researchers tend to 
treat codes of conduct as prima facie complete statements of values, there is significant 
scope for teasing apart the extent to which different dimensions of public value can be 
regulated. While it might be entirely right that government persists with the struggle to 
specify and control corruption, and so persists in trying to define what constitutes 
unacceptable individual self-interested behaviour, despite the difficulties, other principles – 
such as not bringing councils into disrepute, may be seen as too difficult to detach from 
legitimate political competition. 
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Table 1: Contextual information on the nine case study councils 
 
Case 
study 
Thumbnail sketch 
A A relatively affluent district in southern England, with most residents 
enjoying a high quality of life. The council has achieved excellent CPA scores, 
and has been pro-active in helping parishes implement the ethical 
framework. The district itself has experienced very few cases under the Code 
of Conduct; a few have arisen at parish level. 
B A London borough in a socially diverse part of the capital, with pockets of 
affluence and deprivation. The council has experienced excellent CPA scores, 
and has been pro-active in its approach to ethical governance. The borough 
has experienced very few cases under the Code of Conduct. 
C A small district in the Midlands in a relatively deprived area where traditional 
industries have declined. The council is improving its CPA score over time (to 
‘good’ most recently). There have been a large number of complaints under 
the Code of Conduct, most of them amongst members and between officers 
and members. 
D A relatively affluent and fast-expanding district in southern England, with a 
largely rural area. The council has received ‘fair’ CPA scores but has 
experienced problems with its corporate governance, including a large 
number of complaints under the Code of Conduct, most of them amongst 
members and between officers and members. 
E A unitary council in the north of England which covers a largely rural area 
with an affluent population. The council has achieved excellent scores in the 
CPA and few complaints under the Code. The large majority of complaints 
come from the parish councils in the area.  
F A largely urban unitary authority in the North, serving a population that is 
economically and ethnically diverse. The council has achieved a four star 
performance score in the CPA, and has generated a moderate number of 
complaints under the Code of Conduct. 
G A unitary council in southern England with a mostly affluent population. The 
Council has recorded good CPA scores, and has generated a moderate 
number of complaints under the Code of Conduct, though more so from 
among its parishes. 
H A small district council in the Midlands, with an affluent population. The 
Council has recorded poor CPA scores, and generated a large number of 
complaints about misconduct under the Code, most of them by members 
against other members. 
I A socially diverse and in places very deprived metropolitan area in the north 
of England. The Council has achieved poor/fair CPA scores, but neither a 
large number nor a consistent pattern of complaints under the ethical 
framework. A few of these cases did involve unlawful behaviour. 
 
 
